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Abstract
We present a simple theoretical model of household preventive behavior in response
to malaria prevalence. The novelty is to include a trade-off between prevention and
treatment in an otherwise standard epidemiological model of disease transmission,
which depends on the relative price of treatment with respect to prevention. A rela-
tively low price of treatment reduces protection.
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1 Introduction
In spite of the recent decreases in malaria mortality and morbidity (Feachem et al., 2010;
Jamison et al., 2013), this disease persists in large regions of the world. This can be partly
explained by the high heterogeneity in disease environment. Furthermore, the relationship
between economic development and malaria elimination follows a bidirectional relationship,
which has been extensively discussed in the economic literature. Long-lasting insecticidal
nets (LLINs) have been shown to be efficient preventive tools leading to ambitious campaigns
of LLINs dissemination. However, in spite of their mechanical and chemical efficiency, LLINs
are partially used by the populations and the efficiency decreases through time. This hinders
malaria elimination. A malaria trap defined as the result of malaria reinforcing poverty, while
poverty reduces the ability to control malaria, has been found to be one possible explanation
for such paradox (Berthe´lemy et al., 2013).
A review of studies on price-elasticity of health products (Bates et al., 2012), including
malaria specific measures, shows that charging small fees in an attempt to balance access
and “sustainability” may not be a good solution, as relative to free distribution, charging
even very small user fees is highly disincentivizing. Behavioral obstacles to elimination of
malaria also appear to have been underestimated. LLINs reduced malaria transmission and
child morbidity in short-term trials. However, it has been shown (Rhee et al., 2005; Toe´
et al., 2009) that, even in experimental contexts, the use of bednets remained low.
The second strategy, which has been involved in the malaria burden decrease, is the access
improvement to rapid diagnostic tests (RDT) and treatment. Actually, artemisinin-based
chemotherapy (ACT) are very efficacious, in spite some cases of resistances in Asia (Tulloch
et al., 2013). Many countries have pushed up elimination policies based on free access to
ACT. Different studies have studied the impact of the RDT use or knowledge on behaviors
(Cohen, Dupas and Schaner, 2012; Adhvaryu, 2014) showing that many patients are taking
ACT even with negative RDT. All studies recommend to improve both LLIN use and ACT
access. But, none have studied the impact of treatment-based policies on LLIN use.
In this paper, we present a simple theoretical model of preventive and treatment be-
havior related to malaria prevalence. The framework follows the economic epidemiology
literature (Philipson, 2000; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003, 2004, 2005). The novelty is to
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include a trade-off between prevention and treatment which depends on the relative cost of
treatment with respect to prevention. Such behavioral response was also observed following
the introduction of ARV treatments in the US in 1996 (Geoffard and Me´choulan, 2004). In
this context, the benefit that is associated with the scaling-up of ARV treatments in terms
of a decreased number of new infections could be at least partly offset by a relapse in the
preventive behaviors among the general population. In extreme scenarios, the number of
new infections could increase after a larger diffusion of ARV treatments, similar to what has
been modeled for the hypothetical release of a vaccine (Blower and McLean, 1994; Bogard
and Kuntz, 2002).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the epidemio-
logical framework. Protection and treatment are added in 3 and 4. Section 5 outlines the
main implications.
2 Standard epidemiological model of malaria transmis-
sion
A classical approach was used to model transmission of malaria between human populations
and mosquito (Anopheles) populations (Smith and McKenzie, 2004), based on the McDonald
and Ross malaria transmission model. The following classical assumptions have te be beared
for both human and mosquito populations: constant population sizes through time, uniform
contacts, no superinfection or immunity. The time variation of malaria prevalences among
human (eq.1) and mosquito (eq.2) populations are defined as follow:
X˙ = mabZ(1−X)− rX (1)
Z˙ = acX(e−gn − Z)− gZ (2)
where m is the mosquito density (ratio of mosquitoes per human), a is the number of bits
per unit of time and per mosquito, b is the proportion of infected bites that produce infection
among humans, Z is the proportion of infectious mosquitoes, r is the clearance rate of malaria
in humans, c is the proportion of bites on infectious humans that produce transmission to
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mosquitoes, g is the death rate of mosquitoes, and n is the length of sporogonic cycle.
Assuming that the life-time period of humans is long enough, malaria prevalence reaches
a steady state equilibrium defined by a concave function Q(X, m) (see Berthe´lemy et al.
(2013)), for which the slope at origine is the basic reprodution rate, R0, and: Q(0,m) = 0,Q(1,m) < 1 (3)
The function Q(X,m) converges towards the trivial disease free stable steady state, if
R0 ≤ 1. This case is not considered in what follows, as it does not coincide with the per-
sistence of malaria in large regions of the developing world. Conversely, Q(X,m) converges
towards a stable steady state characterized by a strictly positive prevalence of malaria.
3 Economic epidemiological model with protection
The aim of LLIN-based policies is that protection tools such as LLIN could reduce malaria
transmission, leading to a disease free stable steady state. But these policy only address the
problem of LLIN distribution but rarely the LLIN use. Protection behavior has been added
to the previous epidemiological transmission model, based on economic mechanisms and
fully described in Berthe´lemy et al. (2013). Two protective behaviors are defined: LLIN use
(h = 1) or no use (h = 0) leading to malaria exposure. It was assumed that the only mean
to prevent from infection is to use a LLIN, LLIN use was supposed to provide complete
protection. These assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the main findings of the
model (Berthe´lemy et al., 2013). At any time, depending on the use of LLIN before, the
health status of the individual, can be susceptible, σ(h) = S , or infected, σ(h) = I. The
probability of being infected at any time, conditionally to the absence of protection before,
can then be written as:
piI = P (σ(h) = I|h = 0) = Q(X,m) (4)
and then:
X = (1−H)piI (5)
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where H is the proportion of LLIN use among (1−X) uninfected.
The mosquito density, m, is modified by LLIN use: the exposed human population
decreased, being only the proportion 1−H of non-protected population; the absolute number
of mosquitoes decreases with H as LLINs kill mosquitoes (knock down effect). Hence m,
which was a parameter in the pure epidemiological model, can be written as a function of
H as follows :
m(H) =
m(0)
1−H (1− γ(H)) (6)
where γ(H) is the proportion of mosquitoes killed by LLINs, an increasing function of
H, and m(0) is the value of mosquito density in case of no protection. It follows that, at the
steady state, Q(X,m(H), and then the probability of being infected piI depend on H.
At the microeconomic level, the choice of protection is determined by maximizing the
expected utility of each individual. The decision h of protection affects individuals’ utility
through two path: (i) an expected positive impact on the health status in case of protection
and (ii) a private cost, called κ. Protection decision is described through the following
maximization program:
maxhE[u(σ(h))]− κW (ω)h (7)
where u(S) or u(I) are the utility levels attached to the health status (susceptible or
infected thus depending on h, the use of a protection), with 0 < u(I) < u(S); ω is the
individual income; W (ω) is the marginal utility of the income, supposed as usual to decrease
with income. The expected utility (the expected positive impact of using LLIN on the health
status) can be estimated using the following probabilities of being susceptible or infected,
conditionally to the use of protection:

P (σ(h) = S|h = 1) = 1,
P (σ(h) = S|h = 0) = 1− piI ,
P (σ(h) = I|h = 0) = piI .
(8)
As in standard economic epidemiological models, the individual will use protective tools
when W (ω) is lower than the expected utility loss associated with the risk of infection that
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occurs in the absence of protection:
E[u(σ(1))− u(σ(0))] ≥ κW (ω)h (9)
Thus protection occurs if and only if:
piI ≥ κW (ω)
u(S)− u(I) (10)
Indeed, a person will use LLIN if the utility of being non-infected is greater than the
utility of paying for a protective tool, according to the income and the probability of being
infected without using any protection.
The key point in this approach is that the threshold probability of infection depends on
the marginal income utility loss associated with using the LLIN, κW (ω). The threshold
function, linking piI to ω, termed C(ω), is monotonic and C
′(ω) < 0. In addition, the
function C() is increasing with κ. Consequently:
 h = 1 if ω ≥ C−1(piI),h = 0 else (11)
and the income threshold conditioning protection, C−1(piI), decreases with κ. Knowing
individual protection behaviors, the percentage of protected persons can be computed as
follows:
H =
∫ +∞
C−1(piI)
f(ω)dω (12)
where f is the probability density function of ω, describing the income distribution of
the population. The long term properties of the model are described in Berthe´lemy et al.
(2013). In the next section, we include treatment in addition to prevention.
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4 Economic epidemiological model with protection and
treatment
Until now, we have focused on the dynamics without the presence of a treatment choice.
Assuming that an infected individual can buy medical treatment at a unit cost, χ, which
reduces his/her illness, then the treatment does not play exactly the same role as protection.
There are two scenarios.
• Firstly, malaria chemoprophylaxis is a preventive measure and can be assimilated to
the use of ITNs/LLINs in the model rather than to curative measures.
• Secondly, curative measures (or medical treatment in this case) will not play the same
role as protection by ITNs in the model.
Treatment does not have an immediate effect on the infectious status of the individual
but the decision tree changes as, in subsequent period, the infected individual will decide
whether to buy medical treatment or not. The decision can be considered sequential, given
that the decision to buy medical treatment is only taken once infection has been observed.
However, the possibility of buying medical treatment will affect the protection decision before
infection. A decision variable η, is therefore introduced, which is equal to 1 if the individual
buys medical treatment and 0 if he/she does not.
In the subsequent period the treatment decision is represented as:
η = 1 if and only if u(I|η = 1)− u(I|η = 0) ≥ λW (ω) (13)
where u(I|η = 0) is the value of the health status when infected and non-treated, u(I|η =
1) is the value of the health status when infected and treated, with u(I|η = 0) ≤ u(I|η = 1).
λ is the unit cost of the treatment. An individual is susceptible after the treatment but the
value of health is different from u(S) as the individual has been sick, so that u(S) > u(I|η =
1).
There are now two thresholds on piI , depending on the value of η , denoted Cη(ω), with
η = 0 or η = 1.
The condition given in equation (13) can be written as:
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η = 1 if and only if ω ≥ W−1
(
u(I|η = 1)− u(I|η = 0)
λ
)
(14)
For simplicity reason, the right-hand side expression is denoted ω1. It depends only on
parameters of the model (values attached to different health status) and on the price of the
treatment. The higher the price of treatment, the higher ω1, and the smaller the number of
infected individuals who will decide to buy the treatment.
Once this second period decision rule has been established, an individual will choose in
the first period to use the protection device according to a rule comparable to that of the
previous section,
h = 1 if and only if ω ≥ C−1η (piI) for η = 0 or 1 (15)
where C0(ω) =
λW (ω)
u(S)−u(I|η=0) and C1(ω) =
λW (ω)
u(S)−u(I|η=1) .
The complete solution then depends on how ω1, C
−1
0 (piI) and C
−1
1 (piI) compare. From
u(I|η = 0) ≤ u(I|η = 1), it can be inferred that C−10 (piI) ≤ C−11 (piI), ∀piI . Then, there are
only three cases to consider:
• Case 1: ω1 ≤ C−10 (piI) ≤ C−11 (piI)
• Case 2: C−10 (piI) ≤ ω1 ≤ C−11 (piI)
• Case 3: C−10 (piI) ≤ C−11 (piI) ≤ ω1
For case 1, h = 1 implies η = 1 and is obtained if and only if C−11 (piI) ≤ ω, implying:
H =
∫ +∞
C−11 (piI)
f(ω)dω, denoted H1(piI). (16)
For case 2, h = 1 either when C−11 (piI) ≤ ω (and η = 1) or when C−10 (piI) ≤ ω ≤ ω1 (and
η = 0), then:
H = H1(piI) +
∫ ω1
C−10 (piI)
f(ω)dω (17)
For case 3, h = 1 when C−10 (piI) ≤ ω (and η = 0), then:
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H =
∫ +∞
C−10 (piI)
f(ω)dω, denoted H0(piI). (18)
Given the definitions of H0(piI) and H1(piI) it is clear that H1(piI) ≤H0(piI). Overall,
H can be represented as a function of piI as illustrated in Figure 1. This function of piI is
continuous everywhere but not differentiable at C0(ω1) or C0(ω1). For piI ∈ [0, C0(ω1)[, its
partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δpiI
=
f(C−11 (piI))
C ′1(piI)
(19)
while for piI ∈ [C0(ω1), C1(ω1)] , its partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δpiI
=
f(C−11 (piI))
C ′1(piI)
− f(C
−1
0 (piI))
C ′0(piI)
(20)
and for piI ∈ [C1(ω1),+∞[, its partial derivative is equal to:
δH
δpiI
=
f(C−10 (piI))
C ′0(piI)
(21)
Figure 1 illustrates how the model changes in relation with the introduction of a possible
treatment. Specifically, it introduces changes in the protection behavior depending on the
price of treatment λ.
When the price of treatment, λ, increases, ω1 increases and C
−1
0 (piI) and C
−1
1 (piI) decrease.
If the price is very high or very low, the kinks of Figure 1 are moved leftward or upward.
For a price equal to 0 or infinite, they disappear.
5 Conclusions
The main conclusions of the model are the following. First, a low price of treatment (case
1 ) implies that individuals will buy treatment in case of infection, and H = H1(piI). As a
consequence there is less protection than in absence of a treatment, but protective behaviors
are locally invariant with λ.
Second, An intermediate price of treatment (case 2 ) implies that some, but not all,
infected individuals buy treatment. As a consequence there is less protection than in absence
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of a treatment, and protective behaviors depends positively on λ.
Third, a high price of treatment (case 3 ) implies that individuals do not buy treatment
when they are infected, and H = H0(piI). As a consequence the protective behavior is locally
the same as in absence of treatment.
Calibrating the model with known parameters from the literature constitutes avenues for
future research. This could enable us to show how the results generate different predictions
regarding the equilibrium levels of infection and the usage of treatment and prevention from
epidemiological models which do not take this tradeoff explicitly into account.
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